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CURRENT LAW REVIEW DIGEST SERIES
It seems to be generally held that parking meter ordinances do not
interfere with the general public's easement of travel. The courts hold-
ing that although the easement cannot be taken away it is subject to
reasonable regulation. 12
Hal E. Hunter, Jr.
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SIMPLIFICATION or FEDERAL TAX LAWS. Randolph E. Paul, Cornell
Law Quarterly, March, 1944.-In this article the author deals with a
subject of interest to all taxpayers. He makes it clear from the begin-
ning that the problem is a big one. There are many kinds of simplifica-
tions which could take place in our tax system, including simplification
of concept and language; in addition there are levels of simplification.
Whatever the problem, however, the taxpayer must have a clearer un-
derstanding of our revenue system.
After commenting on the 1943 income tax return form and its com-
plexity the author notes the simplification of the 1943 Revenue Act.
It eliminated earned income tax credit; repealed the so-called second
windfall provision of the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, and re-
moved numerous excise tax exemptions.
Mr. Paul then discusses other treasury suggestions for simplification,
which follow: more understandable forms, consolidation of normal tax
and surtax, and graduated withholding. He also calls for the repeal of
the Victory Tax, which has since been stricken out as such, though it
now comprises what is called the normal tax. In addition he asks for
simplification for the businessman saying, "The whole coporate tax
structure needs overhauling; we need better integration between the
personal and the corporate tax. The bankruptcy act has to be coordi-
nated with the tax law."
The next section concerns the importance of simplifying estate and
gift taxes, even though the number of people they effect is few. The
gift tax was ostensibly designed to prevent the avoidance of the estate
tax in addition to the income tax. In order to accomplish this purpose
a tax would yield little revenue. Through disparity in rate, double ex-
emptions, and an annual gift tax exclusion it has failed as a "police-
man tax." After pointing out other errors of the estate and gift taxes,
Mr. Paul warns us to take care in revising them, saying, "The time has
passed when we could afford the luxury of sitting by and watching our
revenue system grow like Topsy."
12 State v. McCarthy, 171 So. 314, 126 Fla. 433 (1936).
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The author further points out that our tax system has black sheep
occasionally, and brings forth the declared-value excess profits tax as
an example. This tax has frequently been blamed for frightening po-
tential venture capital into "safer" investment outlets. The productivity
of the corporation income tax, however, offers at least partial compensa-
tion for its fault. In 1936 the administration made an attempt to de-
emphasize the taxation of corporations as such; under the plan cor-
porate income would have been taxed only once, either as individual
income or as undistributed profits. Because of a fautly compromise
forced by the Senate, the undistributed profits tax died after a short
period of invalidism. Today the corporation income tax is at its all time
peak. The author offers the deduction of preferred dividends and com-
mon dividends from surtax net income as a possible solution. Mr. Paul
concludes by driving home the fact that taxes can be simplified only to
a certain point in our complex society.
This article offers some concrete provisions for a better tax system.
T o achieve such a system, which must be understandable, equitable,
and at the same time revenue producing, is a large order; but we can-
not deny that changes must be made. We must not allow our tax sys-
tem to shackle us with unnecessary chains. Strides forward have been
achieved; they must continue.
Arthur M. Diamond.
STATUTORY ABROGATION OF THE RULE IN SHELLY'S CASE. Elmer J.
Lessman, Illinois Law Review of Northwestern University. May-June,
1944.-The Rule in Shelly's Case took its name from a celebrated case
in Lord Coke's time, although the rule itself antedated that case, and
its origin and the reasons for its adoption have been lost in obscurity.
But various reasons have been given for the existence of the Rule. One
was that the rule having been established in feudal times, when the
law frowned upon gaps in the vesting of title to real property, was es-
tablished to prevent the inheritance, although it was not grounded upon
any narrow feudal principle, being applied rather with the purpose of
facilitating the owner of land by charging it with the debt of the
ancestor. Another reason was that its establishment was in recognition
of the rule that one who conveyed away an interest in fee could not
restrict the disposition of that fee.
The author condemns the rule because it flies in the face of the
intention of the grantor or testator as the case may be, and that the
reasons for its establishment have no basis at the present time. The
author points out that whatever was the reason for it, its effect is the
same as if the estate be given to the individual absolutely in the first
instance so that in a provision of a will, X to A for life and after her
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death one half to A's heirs or to her devisees in case she leaves a will,
the devise lapses wholly where A predeceases the testator. In Illinois
the Rule applies to both deeds and wills.
Mr. Lessman mentions the four considerations that must be ob-
served in order for the Rule to apply: 1. There must be a freehold
estate; 2, there must be a remainder to the heirs of the heirs of the
body of the person taking the life estate; 3,'the two estates, that for
life and that in remainder must be in the same instrument; 4, two
estates must be in the same quality, they must be both legal or both
equitable.
In Illinois the applicability of the rule has been abolished as to
estates in tail by the Sixth section of the Conveyance Act. The Rule
does apply however, to a trust where the particular estate and the re-
mainder are both equitable; it is held not to apply where the remainder
interest arises out of what is called an executory trust, as where the
trustee must make the conveyance or settlement before the remainder
can arise.
The Rule does not apply to personalty, though it has been referred
to in cases by way of analogy, but in such cases it yields to the ex-
press intention of the testator. The author further points out how the
rule has been applied in specific cases in Illinois and in conclusion
he dwells upon its harshness. All this has led the Committee of the
Illinois State Bar Association to respond favorably to the suggestion
of the American Law Institute that the Rule be discontinued as a rule
of property.
William I. O'Connell.
THE PROSECUTION OF CONCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS UNDER THE SELEC-
TIVE SERvICE AcT. Nathan T. Eliff, The Federal Bar Journal, October,
1944.-From October 16, 1940, the date of the first registration, to
June 30, 1944 there were but 10,872 convictions under Selective Train-
ing and Service Act of 1940. With no other method of enforcement
available but the criminal provisions of the Act, the small number of
convictions demonstrates the almost complete acceptance of the Act
on the part of the general public and those persons directly affected by
its provisions.
In 4,363 of these cases the defendants professed some type of religi-
ous or conscientious objection to complying with their obligations un-
der the Act. Also it will be seen that in 3,079 of these 4,363 cases, the
defendants were Jehovah's Witnesses who generally refused to accept the
conscientious objector exemptions of the Act. Of the remaining 1,284
cases, less than half involved defendants who had unsuccessfully sought
exemption from military service as conscientious objectors.
